As one of the most significant pieces of constitutional legislation enacted in the last century, the House of Lords Act 1999 radically reformed the membership of the second chamber of the Westminster parliament by removing almost all the hereditary peers who sat there. The act formed a key part of the constitutional reform agenda of the Labour government elected in 1997, but despite its massive majority in the house of commons, eliminating the hereditary peerage proved far harder than might first have been imagined. This article seeks to explore the events surrounding that act, the political machinations and deals leading up to it, the course of the legislation through parliament, and the intricacies of the process involved in securing constitutional reform of this magnitude. It concludes by examining the consequences of the act for subsequent attempts at further second chamber reform during the rest of the Labour government's time in office.
The House of Lords Act 1999 was one of the most significant pieces of constitutional legislation enacted during the twentieth century, and it (partially) fulfilled a goal that persisted as a key part of the Lords reform agenda since the Parliament Act 1911: that is, the removal of the hereditary peers from the second chamber. In locating the Act within the context of a two-stage approach to Lords reform, the Labour government believed it could remove the most democratically offensive part of the chamber, and then proceed to identify a clear position with respect to compositional reform behind which the party could unite. However, the decade that followed the Act was marked by policy uncertainty and confusion, which rendered the subsequent processes of Lords reform muddled and rudderless, and ironically undermined what was, in fact, a major constitutional change with lasting and substantial consequences for Westminster politics.
The rationale for reform
The Labour Party has, throughout its history, had a highly changeable policy towards the House of Lords, and as late as 1983 was committed in its general election manifesto to abolishing the chamber altogether, and to redesigning Westminster as a unicameral parliament. 1 The Conservative-dominated hereditary peerage in the upper chamber proved in the post-war era to be a source of considerable frustration to Labour governments, both on points of policy and on points of principle. Not only did a hereditary chamber offend the democratising instincts of the Labour Party, but the substantially outnumbered Labour peers in the Lords found themselves easily voted down, regardless of the value of the legislative points they sought to make. 2 In the 1970s and 1980s, the general view held in the Labour Party was that a second chamber could too easily frustrate the wishes of a committed government of the left, and that, rather than expend energy and political capital on reforming it, the far more sensible option was to simply abolish the upper house, and focus instead on reforming the various practices and procedures of the democratically elected lower house in which the government sat.
By 1992, however, the party's policy had changed markedly, and unicameralism was abandoned in favour of support for an elected upper house. unelected Lords, but which also mapped out increasingly coherent plans for devolution, incorporation of the ECHR, and freedom of information. 4 By 1997, these plans had become even further embedded into the Labour Party's policy infrastructure, and the commitment to 'cleaning up' politics and facilitating democratic renewal formed a cornerstone of the New Labour brand promoted by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Policy commitments on the House of Lords received considerably more space in the 1997 manifesto than in previous years, yet also demonstrated that yet another shift in emphasis had occurred since 1992:
The House of Lords must be reformed. As an initial, self-contained reform, not dependent on further reform in the future, the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords will be ended by statute. This will be the first stage in a process of reform to make the House of Lords more democratic and representative … A committee of both Houses of Parliament will be appointed to undertake a wide-ranging review of possible further change and then to bring forward proposals for reform. 5 The fundamental point to note with respect to the 1997 Labour Party manifesto, then, is that it said nothing about the need to create an elected second chamber.
The commitment to reform was restricted to getting rid of the hereditary peers.
Whereas the 1992 manifesto clearly stated the party's intent to create an elected House, the 1997 manifesto said nothing of the sort, instead using the rather less explicit language about making the chamber 'more democratic and Act recounted here would be rather different. As it was, however, the government did delay, and in so doing, allowed the Conservative opposition time to catch its breath and prepare for battle.
Negotiating the reform process
Action to fulfil the manifesto commitment began with the 1998 Queen's Speech, 'utterly absurd' to proceed with legislation in advance of either the government's white paper or the conclusion of the Royal Commission.
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The opposition were also able to make much of the fact that, in the summer of 1998, the government Leader of the House of Lords, Lord Richard, was fired because he was thought to be too strongly in favour of a substantially elected second chamber, and was thus at odds with the prime minister and much of the cabinet. 11 Conservative MP Kenneth Clarke, for example, was a known advocate of an elected element in the second chamber, but in arguing this case for the reformed Lords, However, Cranborne was caught unawares when his own shadow cabinet refused to support the plan he had worked out with Irvine. 15 Cranborne, not to be put off, 'smuggled himself into Number 10, to discuss the deal directly with Tony The basic mechanics of the amendment to allow some hereditary peers to remain proved to be hugely controversial. Margaret Beckett acknowledged the agreement which had been reached to accept an amendment put forward by the crossbenches in the Lords to reprieve 92 peers, and stated that the government was 'minded to accept it' so long as the rest of the government's legislative programme was not frustrated. 21 However, she also made it plain that the government would not accept a similarly worded amendment if it was moved in the Commons instead. 22 Ostensibly, the reason for this was to ensure the good behaviour of the House of Lords on the matter. However, the whole question of 
The legislative process in the Lords
Once the House of Lords Bill was safely in the second chamber, where it arrived on 17 March 1999, things became rather more complicated, and it was at this point in the legislative process that the content of the bill underwent the most change. In his opening remarks on the second reading debate, Lord Strathclyde noted that the only certainty about the whole reform process was that 'no one expects this Bill in this form to become law,' 30 Treaty of Union would be breached. 35 The House of Lords referred both these matters to the Committee for Privileges. Although this committee decided that there was no case to answer with either of these concerns, 36 it did not report until after the summer recess, and it was therefore October 1999 before these legal matters had been resolved to the satisfaction of the upper house. by-elections, thus facilitating their eventual removal through atrophy. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen whether the government will test the Conservative Party's policy on a predominantly elected chamber by introducing a bill near the end of the parliament that would seek to create just that. 48 Consequently, although the incoming Labour government in 1997 pledged to remove all the hereditary peers and then consider more fundamental compositional reform, the fact remains that, at the end of their time in office, a major point of contention concerns the continued existence of some hereditary peers in parliament and the total lack of political will on the part of government to continue the process of reform. Indeed, had the government been as bold with
House of Lords reform as it had been with devolution, the complexion of Westminster would be quite different today, and the basis on which second chamber reform discussions take place would be rather different also.
There is a yet another consequence of the House of Lords Act 1999 which has slightly different implications. To the extent that there was no clearly worked out plan for stage two, opponents of stage one were able to argue during the parliamentary debates that accompanied the House of Lords Act that stripping the hereditary peers from the second chamber left it 'much more in the power of the serving Prime Minister, and would make it a party political machine supporting the Government in power.' 49 The idea that stage one would simply create a House of 'Tony's cronies' which the Labour government would be happy to maintain, because the interim House was a pushover as far as legislation was concerned, was a compelling argument when it was made in 1999, but one which has not turned out to be accurate. Research has demonstrated that, far from becoming a more subservient chamber, the House of Lords has become far more assertive since the removal of most of the hereditary peers, has an increasingly important impact on government policy, and offers far more scrutiny obstacles to legislation than does the House of Commons. 50 While the issue of how legitimacy is conceived is a difficult one, 51 the life peers nevertheless seem to feel less encumbered with the hereditary peers removed, and more willing to fulfil the broad range of parliamentary functions ascribed to the second chamber.
This has impacted on the continued debate about what a reformed second chamber should look like in compositional terms. With the House of Lords increasingly demonstrating the valuable task it performs in the legislative process, those opposed to an elected chamber are now in possession of mounting evidence about the capability and utility of an appointed chamber at Westminster, evidence which those who favour an elected House must formulate increasingly convincing arguments against. Therefore, a major consequence of the House of Lords Act 1999, and the two-stage process of reform in which it was embedded, is that it brought about an interim House which was hugely capable of demonstrating its
